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Ukraine: 




This chapter provides an overview of the demographic situation in Ukraine, including 
explanations for the decline to very low fertility and changes in family policy. Drawing 
on official statistics, survey data, and focus group interviews, the analysis shows that 
the country’s decline to lowest-low fertility is primarily due to the postponement of or 
the  reduction  in  second  births,  as  opposed  to  the  postponement  of  first  births.  The 
chapter includes a discussion on the link between low fertility and changing marriage 
patterns, contraceptive prevalence, and abortion. The author then reviews the evidence 
for  the  leading  explanations  of  fertility  decline  in  Ukraine,  including  economic 
uncertainty, social anomie, the Second Demographic Transition, and unequal gender 
relations. In addition, the author proposes unexplored factors that may lead to fertility 
limitation,  such  as  the  increasing  difficulty  of  combining  work  and  childrearing, 
insufficient  housing,  changes  in  intergenerational  support,  and  the  deterioration  of 
health lifestyles and marital relations. 
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1. Introduction  
Ukraine, which means “border” in Russian and Ukrainian, is wedged between Europe 
and  Russia  –  geographically,  politically,  ideationally,  and  demographically.  The 
country is physically located on the western border of the former Soviet Union, and 
with the addition of Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the European Union, Ukraine 
now abuts the E.U. Politically, the alliance of the country swings between democracy of 
the  West  and  dependence  on  Russia.  Its  people  alternate  between  embracing  new, 
individualistic,  Western-oriented  values  and  maintaining  conventional,  Soviet-
dominated ideology. Economically, Ukraine vacillates between capitalist reform and 
socialist standards, teetering between the brink of crisis and the threshold of recovery. 
Demographically,  Ukraine  is  adopting  new  types  of  family  formation,  while  still 
adhering to conservative gender roles and traditional childbearing norms, such as early 
childbearing. 
This  chapter  discusses  demographic  developments  in  Ukraine  as  it  balances 
between  old  and  new,  East  and  West.  Using  official  data  and  the  Ukrainian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), I first present an in-depth analysis of change 
in fertility over time and then explain the extent to which Ukraine differs from other 
very low fertility countries, especially in regard to the timing of first births and the 
postponement of or reduction in second births. There follows an analysis of changes in 
the proximate determinants of childbearing, including increases in non-marital births 
and  cohabitation,  and  changes  in  contraceptive  use  and  abortion.  Next,  I  outline 
common  explanations  of  very  low  fertility  in  this  region  and  discuss  supporting 
evidence. This is followed by an explanation of the expansion of family policy over the 
past  two  decades  as  well  as  the  faults  in  the  system.  Finally,  I  suggest  alternative 
explanations for the decline in fertility, including changes in the relationship between 
female  labor-force  participation  and  childbearing,  the  lack  of  affordable  housing, 
changes in intergenerational support flows, and increases in household disruption. 
The data for this chapter come from a number of sources. The aggregate data are 
from annual yearbooks published by the Ukrainian Committee for Statistics. Much of 
this  official  data,  however,  does  not  include  births  by  parity  and  mother’s  age. 
Therefore,  I  also  rely  on  retrospective  birth  histories  and  other  measures  from  the 
ULMS, a nationally representative survey of the working-age population of Ukraine. 
The analysis draws on the first round of the survey, conducted in 2003. The primary 
purpose of the ULMS is to describe the population’s economic activity by collecting 
retrospective  work  histories  and  information  about  work  in  the  past  week.  The 
individual  survey  includes  birth  and  marital  histories,  detailed  questions  about 
education  and  training,  and  some  broad  political  and  health  questions.  The  ULMS 
conducted  interviews  with  8641  individuals  in  4056  households  and  produced  a Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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response rate of 66% (KIIS 2003). I also refer to focus group research, which I with the 
help of assistants conducted in the summers of 2002, 2003, and 2006. Each focus group 
interviewed eight to ten individuals; fifteen interviews were conducted with women and 
seven were held with men. The groups were prompted to discuss family life, children, 
and  marital  and  childbearing  decisions.  Participants  were  recruited  by  handing  out 
flyers and approaching pedestrians in front of metro stations. The respondents varied in 
income,  education,  and  region.  While  their  responses  are  not  representative  of  the 
country as a whole, they provide insights into attitudes toward the quantity and timing 
of fertility and yield background information used to generate hypotheses and guide the 
interpretation of quantitative analyses. 
 
 
2. Demographic analysis   
2.1 The population of Ukraine   
The territory of Ukraine spans an area larger than France, and its population is one of 
the largest in Europe. The population is rapidly shrinking, however, resulting in what 
many have called a demographic crisis (Steshenko 2001, Chuiko 2001). Since Ukraine 
gained independence in 1991, death rates in the country have been higher than birth 
rates, causing a loss in population of up to 373,000 people per year. Within 13 years, its 
population declined by 5.3 million, from a high of 52.2 million in 1993 to 46.9 million 
in 2006 (Derzhkomstat 2006). Although emigration played a role – approximately 1.2 
million people left Ukraine during this period, a figure that represents 23% of the total 
decline (Derzhkomstat 2006) – the largest decline was due to low fertility. 
 
 
2.2 Period total fertility rates and the decline to ‘lowest-low fertility’  
Ukraine  experienced  the  first  demographic  transition  well  after  most  countries  in 
Western Europe; its fertility did not begin to decline until the 20
th century, and then it 
fell from a total fertility rate (TFR) of 5.2 in the 1920s to 1.99 in 1988-89 (Steshenko 
2001). The majority of the decline during this period was due to a limitation of higher 
parity births; the young age pattern and the universality of childbearing changed very 
little. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the TFR remained stable around 2.0.   
The TFR has been declining dramatically since the country gained independence, 
from a high of 1.8 to its current low level of 1.2, as shown in Figure 1. Ukraine reached 
the lowest period TFR – 1.1 in 2000 – and is still considered a ‘lowest-low’ fertility Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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country,  with a TFR  under 1.3. While recent data suggests that  some recovery  has 
occurred, the Ukrainian TFR was still only 1.2 in 2005.  
 
 


































Source: Ukrainian Statistical Agency, 2006. The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2003. 
 
 
The  path  to  lowest-low  fertility  in  Ukraine  has  differed  from  that  followed  in 
Southern and Central Europe (Perelli-Harris 2005), with the majority of the decline in 
the country  driven by the postponement of or reduction in second births rather than the 
postponement of first births. Most of Western and Central Europe experienced a rapid 
increase in the mean age at first birth (MAFB), which led to tempo distortions in the 
TFR  (Kohler,  Billari,  Ortega  2002).  In  Ukraine,  however,  the  relatively  young  age 
pattern and the  universality  of childbearing  hardly changed as the TFR declined to 
lowest-low.  From 1985 to 1999, the MAFB  fluctuated between 21 and 22 (Perelli-
Harris 2005), with lowest-low fertility (1.3) achieved in 1997 primarily through the 
decline of second births. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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Figure 2 and Table 1 show a crude approximation of fertility rates by parity, based 
on the ULMS. According to Figure 2, first birth rates oscillated between 1.0 and 0.8 
births per woman until 1997 and then started to decline. This indicates that very little 
postponement  or  reduction  in  first  births  occurred  until  the  late  1990s,  but  was  a 
significant contributor to lowest-low fertility thereafter. Second birth rates started to 
decline much earlier, even before Ukraine gained independence. Figure 2 shows that 
they were slightly higher than 1 birth per woman in 1987, but then declined rapidly in 
the early 1990s and fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.5 throughout the rest of the decade. 
Third and higher fertility rates remained very low throughout the entire period, rarely 
reaching 0.3 births and with a moving average between 0.1 and 0.2 in the 1990s. The 
figure provides evidence that the postponement of or the reduction in second births was 
the primary cause of the initial decline to lowest-low fertility in Ukraine, and that the 
postponement of or the reduction in first births was a contributing factor to lowest-low 
fertility in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
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Table 1:  Total fertility rates by parity and three year moving averages,  
  1982–2002  
 
  TFR1  TFR2  TFR3  TFR4+  MA1  MA2  MA3  MA4+ 
1982  0.98  0.74  0.17  0.05         
1983  1.09  1.08  0.30  0.06  0.98  0.84  0.23  0.07 
1984  0.85  0.70  0.22  0.11  0.93  0.92  0.23  0.10 
1985  0.85  0.97  0.17  0.14  0.95  0.81  0.20  0.13 
1986  1.15  0.76  0.21  0.14  1.03  0.93  0.20  0.11 
1987  1.10  1.07  0.23  0.04  1.16  0.90  0.21  0.08 
1988  1.24  0.87  0.18  0.06  1.09  0.83  0.17  0.07 
1989  0.94  0.56  0.10  0.10  0.98  0.72  0.13  0.11 
1990  0.77  0.73  0.12  0.18  0.91  0.66  0.10  0.12 
1991  1.01  0.70  0.09  0.07  0.92  0.67  0.12  0.10 
1992  0.99  0.60  0.15  0.04  0.91  0.59  0.13  0.06 
1993  0.73  0.49  0.14  0.08  0.84  0.49  0.13  0.06 
1994  0.80  0.39  0.09  0.07  0.77  0.45  0.11  0.07 
1995  0.79  0.46  0.09  0.06  0.86  0.43  0.10  0.06 
1996  1.00  0.44  0.13  0.05  0.89  0.47  0.09  0.05 
1997  0.87  0.50  0.04  0.04  0.89  0.42  0.07  0.04 
1998  0.81  0.33  0.05  0.03  0.84  0.42  0.06  0.03 
1999  0.85  0.43  0.09  0.01  0.81  0.36  0.06  0.01 
2000  0.78  0.33  0.05  0.00  0.76  0.42  0.09  0.01 
2001  0.67  0.50  0.12  0.03  0.71  0.42  0.09  0.03 
2002  0.68  0.43  0.09  0.06         
Change 1989 to 1995 (in %)  –12  –40  –23  –45 
Change 1995 to 2001 (in %)  –17  –2  –10  –50 
Change 1989 to 2001 (in %)  –28  –42  –31  –72 
 
Source: Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2003. 
 
Compared with Southern and Central European countries, the MAFB in Ukraine 
has remained low. Table 2 shows the MAFB throughout the past decade, based on the 
ULMS and official registry data. According to the ULMS, the MAFB has never risen 
above 22.8 and began to decline in the late 1990s, but these results are based on sample 
data and do not account for truncation. Official data shows that the MAFB increased 
from age 22.8 in 2000 to 23.5 in 2005. Still, this age is very low compared to the 
MAFB of other Central European countries that experienced rapid postponement in the 
1990s; the MAFB of the Czech Republic, e.g., stood at 26.6 in 2005 (Sobotka et al. 
2008).  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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Table 2:  Mean age at first birth, 1990–2005  
 
Year  ULMS  Ukrainian Statistical Agency 
1990  23.1   
1991  22.9   
1992  22.2   
1993  22.7   
1994  22.8   
1995  22.4  22.2 
1996  23.3  22.2 
1997  22.7  22.3 
1998  22.4  22.2 
1999  22.3  22.7 
2000  21.7  22.8 
2001  22.4   
2002  22.4   
2003     
2004     
2005          23.5 
 
Source: ULMS, 2003; Ukrainian Statistical Agency, 2006. 
 
The young pattern of family formation dates back several centuries, as in other 
countries  east  of  “Hajnal’s  line”,  which  runs  from  Trieste  to  St.  Petersburg  (Coale 
1992). Although the economic and social situation in the country changed dramatically 
after the break up of the Soviet Union, norms influencing the age at childbearing have 
been slower to change (Perelli-Harris 2005). Respondents of focus groups conducted in 
2002 and 2003 reported that they felt pressure from parents and peers to marry and have 
at  least  one  child  early  rather  than  risk  becoming  an  ‘old  maid’.  They  cited 
physiological and medical reasons to give birth early, reasons advocated by doctors and 
other  medical  professionals.  Many  respondents  expressed  the  fear  of  their  health 
deteriorating in their late 20s, leading to complications during pregnancy and labor. 
Furthermore,  respondents  believed  that  the  likelihood  of  medical  complications  and 
infertility would increase health threats such as poor nutrition, ecological hazards, the 
Chernobyl disaster, and declines in the standard of living. Finally, the early age at first 
birth is linked to a lack of contraceptive methods other than abortion. Because of a fear 
that aborting a first pregnancy may lead to infertility, women usually prefer to take their 
first pregnancy to term. Therefore, while Western Europeans rationalize that it is best to 
postpone childbearing, Ukrainians reason that it is better to have children young, i.e. 
when their bodies are most suited for reproduction. 
 Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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Nonetheless, the age pattern of childbearing does seem to be slowly shifting to a 
later pattern. Figure 3 shows the distribution of age-specific fertility rates over the past 
20 years. Up to 2000, the shape of the curves consistently peaked around age 20-24, 
with a reduction in the total number of births for each consecutive time period. The 
sharp peaks generally indicate that nearly all women gave birth to their first child while 
in their early 20s, and all-parity childbearing decreased after age 25. In 2005, the curve 
started to flatten out, with an increase in births in the 25-29 age group. It is difficult to 
know  from  Figure  3  whether  the  increase  in  births  in  this  age  group  is  due  to 
recuperated  second  births  or  the  realization  of  delayed  first  births.  Parity-specific 
fertility rates, however, suggest that both processes took place. Ukraine’s fertility rate 
for first births (TFR1) in 2005 was 0.71, up from 0.65 in 2000. The second birth fertility 
rate (TFR2) in 2005 stood at 0.38, compared to 0.32 in 2000. The third birth fertility rate 
(TFR3) also increased slightly, from 0.07 births per woman in 2000 to 0.08 in 2005, 
although the increase is so slight as to be negligible. The fourth and higher birth rates 
(TFR4+) were the same in the two years – 0.04 (Ukrainian Statistical Agency, 2006). 
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2.3 Cohort total fertility  
With  such  rapid  decline  in  period  total  fertility,  it  is  difficult  to  know  at  this  time 
whether cohort total fertility rates will mirror period total fertility rates or whether some 
recuperation  will  occur.  Rough  estimates  based  on  the  ULMS  indicate  that  cohort 
fertility will continue to decline. Figure 5 presents differences in age-specific cohort 
fertility rates, using the 1950 cohort as a base. I have combined five year cohorts in 
order to increase the numbers on which the estimates are based. The 1950-54 cohorts 
had a total completed fertility rate around 1.9, which was relatively stable through to the 
1960-64 cohorts. In comparison, the 1965-69 cohorts had a completed fertility of only 
1.6 births per woman, although these cohorts were only 34-38 years old at the time of 
survey. By age 29, the 1970-74 cohorts had borne approximately 21% fewer children 
than the 1950 cohort. The cumulative fertility of the 1975-79 cohort by age 24 in 2003 
was also 21% lower than in 1950. Again, this indicates that cohorts are experiencing 
either postponement of childbearing to older ages or a quantum decline. Thus, it is 
unlikely that cohort fertility will fully recover.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Differences in cumulative age-specific cohort fertility rates compared  
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2.4 Childlessness  
In contrast to the pattern found in the countries of Western Europe, childbearing in 
Ukraine has remained nearly universal. According to the ULMS, only 4% of the 1960-
64  birth  cohorts  and  7%  of  the  1965-69  birth  cohorts  remained  childless  in  2003. 
Among women from the 1970-74 cohorts, aged 29-33 at the time of survey, only 13% 
remained  childless.  Thus,  while  childlessness  may  be  increasing  somewhat,  it  is 
unlikely that Ukrainian women will experience the high levels of childlessness found in 
other low fertility countries in the near future. Because at least some primary infertility 
exists in all societies, the low level of childlessness in Ukraine indicates that voluntary 
childlessness  must  be  very  low.  This  universal  pattern  of  fertility  provides  further 
evidence  that  Ukraine  has  achieved  very  low  fertility  through  a  different  path  than 
Western  and  Central  European  countries  (Perelli-Harris  2005),  although  sustained 
levels of very low fertility may be due to increasing childlessness.  
 
 
3. Determinants of fertility  
3.1 Education  
Ukraine has a highly educated population. An analysis of the ULMS shows that in 
2002, 25% of women aged above 30 had less than a high school education, 19% had 
graduated from high school, 40% had vocational or professional training, and 16% had 
completed a Bachelor’s degree or above. As is the case in most societies, completed 
fertility  levels  differ  by  education.  However,  only  recently  has  the  timing  of 
childbearing  started  to  change  dramatically  by  level  of  education.  Within  the  past 
decade, more highly educated women have begun to postpone first births, while women 
with less than college education have maintained the previous age pattern of fertility 
(Perelli-Harris,  forthcoming).  During  the  period  of  rapid  social  change  following 
Ukraine’s  independence,  the  relationship  between  education  and  the  initiation  of 
childbearing reversed: once school enrollment and marriage are controlled for, the more 
highly educated women changed from having significantly higher first birth rates before 
independence  to  lower  first  birth  rates  after  independence.  The  general  population, 
however, has experienced very little delay in the entrance into motherhood.  
Using  the  Kaplan-Meier  method,  Figure  5  illustrates  the  changing  relationship 
between higher education and first birth timing, although the figures do not include 
controls for school enrolment or marriage. The earlier period refers to women who 
turned 17 between February 1980 and September1991, and the later period refers to 
women who turned 17 between September 1991 and April 2003 (for more details on the Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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study, see Perelli-Harris, forthcoming). The curves for lower education start to diverge 
around  30  months  (19.5  years),  indicating  that  women  with  lower  education  in  the 
earlier period had slightly  lower (although statistically insignificant) first birth rates 
than their counterparts in the later period. The difference between the earlier and later 
period  curves  for  higher  education,  however,  is  much  wider.  After  having  delayed 
childbearing  due  to  school  enrolment,  more  highly  educated  women  in  the  earlier 
period experienced a very steep increase in first birth rates and nearly caught up with 
their less educated counterparts. In the later period, the distribution for more highly 
educated  women  curves  outwards,  indicating  a  significant  delay.  This  change  in 
relationship signifies a new process of reproductive decision-making for more highly 
educated  women.  Only  time  will  tell  whether  these  women  are  innovators  in  the 
postponement of childbearing, with the rest of the population following their lead, or 
whether entrenched social norms will maintain the overall early pattern of first births.  
 
 
Figure 5:  Comparison of first birth survival distributions by education  
and period. “Earlier period” refers to events occurring  
Feb. 1980-Sept. 1991, and “later period” refers to events occurring 
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Second birth rates, on the other hand, have declined in a similar manner for women 
with  all  levels  of  education  (Perelli-Harris,  forthcoming).  Unlike  the  reversal  that 
occurred for first births, there has been no reversal in the effects of education on second 
birth  rates.  Figure  5  shows  that  second  birth  rates  for  women  with  all  levels  of 
education were higher in the earlier period than they were in the later period. Although 
more highly educated women in the later period experienced lower birth rates than in 
the earlier period, the relationship between education and second birth rates did not 
change. These results suggest that education itself has not been a primary factor in the 
postponement or elimination of second births; women of all educational levels have 
refrained from additional childbearing. Further possible explanations for the decline in 
second births will be discussed below.  
 
 
Figure 6:  Comparison of second birth survival distributions by education  
  and period. “Earlier period” refers to events occurring  
  Feb. 1980-Sept. 1991, and “later period” refers to events  
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3.2 Region and ethnicity  
Fertility in Ukraine differs significantly by region and to some degree by ethnicity. 
According to 2000 official data, the TFR was 1.4 births per woman in Western Ukraine, 
1.1  in  Central  Ukraine  and  1.0  in  Eastern  Ukraine.  Some  of  this  difference  is 
attributable to urban-rural differences; the majority of the population in the East lives in 
cities, while western Ukraine is largely rural. Yet the regions differ in other ways, e.g., 
in their orientation towards family life and national identity. Focus group respondents 
from  all  regions  thought  that  the  western  region  of  the  country  followed  a  more 
traditional, religious, and nationalistic family orientation, while they perceived that the 
eastern part of the country remained under the influence of Soviet ideology. Political 
attitudes, public opinion, and electoral behavior are consistently found to be associated 
with regional differences (Kubicek 2000, Birch 2000, Barrington 2002, Arel 1995). The 
regions  also  followed  different  economic  trajectories.  Eastern  Ukraine  is  more 
industrialized than the other regions, specializing in coal mining and heavy industry, 
and  following  political  independence  from  the  Soviet  Union,  much  of  this  region 
became economically depressed. Central Ukraine, called the breadbasket of the Soviet 
Union, has been dominated by agriculture, food processing, and light industry. Western 
Ukraine  historically  has  been  primarily  engaged  in  agricultural  production,  but  its 
productivity lagged behind other regions (Birch 2000); following the break up of the 
Soviet Union, this region began to orient itself towards the West, with many inhabitants 
temporarily migrating abroad for work. Thus, each region has faced different challenges 
during  the  post-Soviet  period,  challenges  that  may  result  in  a  variety  of  family-
formation responses and need to be analyzed further. 
 
 
4. Proximate determinants of childbearing  
4.1 Marriage  
Like  childbearing,  marriage  is  nearly  universal  in  Ukraine:  80%  of  all  the  ULMS 
female respondents under the age of 65 had ever married, and of those over 25 years of 
age, 94% had ever married. Of men aged above 25, 90.5% had ever married, partially 
reflecting  the  fact  that  men  are  generally  older  at  marriage  than  their  female 
counterparts. Official statistics show that marriage rates, which include first marriages 
and  remarriages,  declined  after  Ukraine  gained  independence  (Derzhkomstat  2005). 
According to the ULMS, marriage rates between 1980 and 1991 were 50% higher than 
those  marriage  rates  between  1991  and  2002  (Perelli-Harris,  forthcoming).  It  is 
impossible  to  know  at  this  point  in  time  whether  marriages  are  being  postponed, Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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whether more people are remaining without partners, or whether couples are choosing 
to cohabit instead of marry. The ULMS data, however, indicates that at least part of this 
decline is due to first marriage postponement; the mean age at first marriage increased 
over  the  past  decade  by  about  one  year  to  22.7  for  women  and  to  25.8  for  men. 
Postponement  of  marriage  usually  means  that  there  is  a  corresponding  delay  in 
childbearing.  
Unlike with first births, the relationship between education and marriage did not 
reverse after Ukraine’s independence (Perelli-Harris, forthcoming). Instead, marriage 
rates fell  for all  women regardless of their level of education. In fact, once school 
enrolment is controlled for, women  with higher levels of education had higher first 
marriage  rates  both  before  and  after  Ukrainian  independence.  This  relationship 
probably  indicates  that  more  highly  educated  women  are  in  higher  demand  on  the 
marriage market and that they had greater resources – e.g., the potential to secure a job 
– with which to marry. 
Compared to other countries in Europe, cohabitation is not very widespread in 
Ukraine. According to the 2003 ULMS, only 5% of the respondents reported currently 
living  in  an  ‘unregistered’  marriage  (the  term  used  in  the  ULMS  to  refer  to 
cohabitation) at the time of survey. This percentage does not increase dramatically for 
younger  cohorts;  only  7%  of  the  1970-74  and  a  mere  8%  of  the  1975-79  cohorts 
reported being in an ‘unregistered’ marriage. Because of the high level of commitment 
implied by the term ‘unregistered marriage’, the term may not capture all cohabiting 
relationships.  Couples  in  romantic  relationships  may  be  living  together  without 
considering themselves to be in an ‘unregistered’ marriage. Focus group discussions 
revealed that other terms, such as ‘civil union’ or ‘living together’, may capture the 
increase  in  cohabitation  more  accurately.  More  research  needs  to  be  conducted  to 
determine the meaning of cohabitation in Ukraine and how widespread cohabitation is. 
 
 
4.2 Non-marital childbearing  
In  Ukraine,  marriage  and  childbearing  have  traditionally  been  linked,  although  this 
relationship has changed recently. Before the break up of the Soviet Union, marriage 
was  usually  a  precondition  for  childbearing,  but  this  did  not  necessarily  apply  to 
conception (Perelli-Harris 2005). As in many countries (Wu and Wolf 2001), the link 
between marriage and childbearing has eroded over the past decade, and non-marital 
childbearing has increased. Figure 6 shows the rise in the proportion of non-marital 
births: from 11% in 1990 to 21% in 2005 (Derzhkomstat 2006). No official information 
is available as to whether these births occurred within cohabiting unions or to single 
mothers.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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Data  from  the  ULMS  shows  that  non-marital  childbearing  is  associated  with 
incomplete  high  school  education  (Perelli-Harris,  forthcoming).  First  birth  rates  for 
women with incomplete high school education are nearly twice as high as they are for 
women with a high school education, suggesting that women who do not marry before 
the birth of a child drop out of school. In addition, women enrolled in school had non-
marital first birth rates that were 73% lower than their counterparts not enrolled in 
school. On the other hand, non-marital births in Ukraine tend to be spread throughout 
the reproductive lifespan rather than concentrated among teenagers. Based on these 
results, it is difficult to conclude whether the increase in non-marital births is due to 
changing values and the acceptance of cohabitation, similar to what has occurred in the 
Scandinavian  countries,  or  whether  non-marital  births  are  the  result  of  economic 
difficulties  that  discourage  marriage,  as  among  disadvantaged  groups  in  the  United 
States (Rindfuss et al. 1996). Nonetheless, the association between incomplete high-
school  education  and  non-marital  childbearing  suggests  that  non-marital  births  in 
Ukraine may occur among more disadvantaged women. 
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4.3 Contraception  
The use of modern methods of contraception, such as oral contraceptives, condoms, and 
IUDs,  is  a  relatively  new  phenomenon  in  Ukraine.  Before  the  disintegration  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  couples  relied  on  either  traditional  methods  such  as  withdrawal  and 
periodic abstinence, or abortion. Recently, contraceptive prevalence has increased and 
abortion rates have declined. According to the 1999 Ukrainian Reproductive Health 
Survey (URHS), modern contraceptive prevalence increased by 7% from 1994 to 1999 
(KIIS 2001). In 1999, overall contraceptive use among women within a registered or 
unregistered marriage was 68%. The use of modern methods of contraception, however, 
is  much  lower;  only  38%  of  women  used  them,  while  30%  used  either  periodic 
abstinence  or  withdrawal  (KIIS  2001).  Women  in  union  who  employed  a  modern 
method either used IUDs (19%) or condoms (14%). Only 3% of women relied on oral 
contraceptives. The level of modern contraceptive prevalence is low relative to other 
countries in the region, e.g., 53% of women in Russia used modern contraceptives, 50% 
in  Moldova  and  55%  in  Kazakhstan  (Seltzer  et  al.  2003).  The  discontinuation  of 
modern contraceptive use and contraceptive failure rates are much higher in Ukraine 
than they are in other regions, especially for oral contraceptives (Seltzer et al. 2003). 
This leads to many unintended pregnancies – both mistimed and unwanted – a majority 
of  which  are  terminated,  increasing  the  risk  of  medical  complications  and  poor 
reproductive health.  
Given the relatively low level of modern contraceptive prevalence and high failure 
rates,  it  is  not  surprising  that  abortion  rates  are  still  high  relative  to  international 
standards. According to official statistics, the official abortion rate declined from 1990 
to 2002, from 70 to 22 abortions per 1000 women of childbearing age, but the accuracy 
of these statistics is questionable. According to the URHS, the abortion rate in 1999 
was 54 abortions per 1000 women of childbearing age, which is higher by about 30% 
than the official statistics (KIIS 2001). The latter missed abortions performed outside of 
the public health system, due to underreporting and other reasons (Seltzer et al. 2003). 
According to the URHS report, induced abortion is a common procedure no matter 
what  measure  is  used.  For  example,  43%  of  the  respondents  ever  had  an  induced 
abortion. Also, the total induced abortion rate (the mean number of lifetime abortions 
per woman based on current age-specific abortion rates) was about 1.6 abortions per 
woman in the two years before the interview.  
Although abortion is common in the country, Ukrainian women are unlikely to 
terminate  first  pregnancies,  due  to  a  fear  of  post-abortion  sterility  or  complications 
arising from the procedure (Perelli-Harris 2005). Instead, abortion is primarily used to 
space and stop as opposed to delay childbearing. The limited availability of alternate 
contraceptive methods and the reluctance to abort first pregnancies has played a role in 
maintaining a young age at first birth. As other methods of contraception become more Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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widely available, women can begin to delay childbearing. More highly educated women 
have greater knowledge of and access to other forms of contraception (KIIS 2001). 
Therefore, the spread of contraception enables women to control the timing of their 
pregnancies, with more highly educated women changing their behavior first. 
 
 
4.4 Desired fertility  
Survey data on desired fertility supports the assertion that childbearing in Ukraine is 
nearly  universal,  and  that  on  average,  Ukrainians  desire  to  have  two  children.  For 
example, according to the ULMS only 3% of women under age 45 reported at the time 
of the survey that they did not want children, indicating that most women desire at least 
one child. A slightly greater number of men intend to remain childless: 5% reported 
they wanted zero children. The mean number of desired children for both men and 
women under age 45 was 2.0. Of the female respondents, 66% desired to have two 
children, 15% wanted one, and 16% wanted more than two. Of the male respondents, 
64% desired to have two children, 16% wanted one, and 16% expressed preference for 
more  than  two.  The  ULMS  also  asked  respondents  what  their  preferred  number  of 
children would be if they could start their adult life over again under ideal economic 
conditions.  The  mean  number  of  children  rose  to  2.3  for  both  men  and  women, 
suggesting  that  childbearing  preferences  and  behavior  have  been  depressed  by  the 
current economic situation.  
 
 
5. Explanations towards very low fertility in Ukraine  
Fertility researchers have developed a number of explanations for the recent decline to 
very  low  fertility  throughout  Europe,  and  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet 
Union  in  particular.  The  explanations  fall  into  the  following  categories:  economic 
uncertainty, societal-level stress and anomie, changing values and belief systems, and 
unequal gender relations. The categories are not meant to be exclusive; the explanations 
overlap and could be occurring in some combination. In the section below, I discuss 
these explanations and any relevant evidence. I include explanations and evidence that 
pertains to Russia for the following reason: although Ukraine differs in many ways 
from Russia, both societies share similar cultural practices of family formation and have 
experienced parallel trajectories of change on the societal level.  
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5.1 Economic uncertainty  
Economic uncertainty caused by economic crisis or depression is one of the leading 
explanations for lowest-low fertility (Kohler et al. 2002, Macura 2004). According to 
this argument, macro-level economic instability leads to financial uncertainty on the 
individual level, delaying union formation and childbearing in early adulthood in favor 
of continued residence in the parental household and the pursuit of higher education and 
job stability. In some societies, economic uncertainty is less likely to delay entry into 
parenthood, but may lead to the delay or elimination of higher-parity births, as parents 
realize they can not afford to have more children (Philipov 2002, Perelli-Harris 2005). 
The hypotheses predicting the negative association between labor market crises and 
fertility emerge from micro-economic fertility theory. Economic or ‘demand’ theories 
of fertility posit a cost-benefit framework of analysis, in which parents maximize utility 
by balancing decisions about consumption with income and resources (Becker 1991, 
Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). In such a model, children are considered one of the 
trade-offs; they use up psychological, financial, and time resources that parents would 
otherwise  spend  elsewhere.  According  to  this  perspective,  in  times  of  labor  market 
crisis when individuals experience involuntary job loss or face the prospect of job loss, 
the  strains  on  income  or  potential  income  should  lead  couples  to  forego  or  delay 
childbearing.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine experienced a grave economic 
crisis,  leading  to  individual  level  economic  uncertainty.  Between  1991  and  1998, 
Ukraine failed to experience a single year of economic growth; the country’s percent 
change in GDP was consistently negative. As a result, the GDP per capita declined by 
60% and unemployment rates rose to at least 12%. The proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line increased, and 45.2% lived on less than one dollar a day in 
1999  (UNDP  Ukraine  2002:14-37).  Since  2000,  the  macro-economic  situation  has 
improved dramatically, with GDP growth rates surpassing neighboring EU countries. In 
2004,  Ukraine’s  GDP  growth  stood  at  12%,  one  of  the  fastest  rates  in  the  world 
(Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 2005). At least some of this economic growth has 
contributed to a rising standard of living and declining poverty; real population income 
was 72% higher in 2004 than in 1999, and the overall ratio of average income to the 
poverty line increased by 80% from 2000 to 2004 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 
2005). It is questionable, however, how much these improvements have reduced overall 
economic uncertainty on the individual level.  
While  economic  uncertainty  does  seem  to  be  a  plausible  explanation  for  the 
dramatic  fertility  decline  in  the  former  Soviet  Union,  the  only  evidence  for  such  a 
relationship is found on the macro-level. Throughout the 1990s, there was a correlation 
between declining economic output and fertility (Heleniak 1995, Steshenko 2001), but 
this correlation does not prove causality. Also, fertility did not increase substantially Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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once  macro-economic  conditions  improved.  More  importantly,  studies  of  the 
relationship between fertility and economic uncertainty on the individual level have 
been inconclusive. For example, no consistent relationship between men’s or women’s 
unemployment and fertility has been found in Ukraine (Perelli-Harris, forthcoming) or 
in  Russia  (Perelli-Harris  2006a,  Kohler  and  Kohler  2002).  Income  has  had  only  a 
minimal effect, quickly becoming insignificant with the inclusion of other factors such 
as  education  (Perelli-Harris  2006a).  Other  attempts  to  operationalize  economic 
uncertainty  through subjective measures, such as concerns about job loss, have had 
inconclusive  results  (Kohler  and  Kohler  2002).  Thus,  conventional  microeconomic 
factors such as formal employment in the labor force and income do not appear to 
constitute the most important factors in the decline to very low fertility.  
 
 
5.2 Social anomie and societal-level stress  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil of the 1990s has had a broader impact 
on the Ukrainian society than simply causing financial hardship. The disintegration of 
the  Soviet  Union  has  led  to  rapid  social  change,  resulting  in  the  reorganization  of 
society and the transformation of values and expectations. This instability has led to 
social anomie, or a breakdown in social norms (Durkheim 1984 [1893]). The negative 
change has caused individuals to feel they have lost control over their lives, resulting in 
high  levels  of  stress  and  anxiety  (Dooley  et  al.  1996,  Fenwick  and  Tausig  1994). 
Psychological studies have shown that stressful conditions can lead to a host of negative 
outcomes, such as poor health (Schneiderman et al. 2005), depression (Hammen 2005), 
and poor health behaviors (Schneidermann et al. 2005). In Ukraine, stressful conditions 
are said to have resulted in lower life expectancy (UNDP 2004), high levels of distress 
and anxiety (Kohn et al. 2002), and low levels of self-reported health (Gilmore, McKee, 
and Rose 2002). 
Social anomie, as opposed to simple economic uncertainty, may be one of the 
main  reasons  for  the  rapid  decline  in  fertility  in  Ukraine.  Social  anomie  can  make 
people averse to taking on additional risks, such as childbearing and rearing (Perelli-
Harris 2006a, Philipov 2002). Ukraine is a highly educated society, in which parents 
have developed a desire for ‘quality’ children (Becker 1991). Therefore, under anomic 
conditions,  Ukrainians  may  be  reluctant  to  bring  another  child  into  the  world,  not 
necessarily because they do not have the means to do so, but because they feel that they 
have  lost  control  over  their  environment.  They  may  feel  hopeless  when  faced  with 
everyday conflict and the breakdown in social norms, and may limit their childbearing 
to avoid exposing someone else to such a life. They may want to avoid expending the 
additional physical and emotional energy that raising children requires.  Hence, the Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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postponement or avoidance of childbearing is not only a response to individual financial 
concerns, but also a psychological reaction to anomic conditions.  
Perelli-Harris (2006a) found that in Russia, subjective well-being and participation 
in  informal  work  can  act  as  buffers  to  the  anomic  conditions  leading  to  very  low 
fertility. Both factors provide people with the means to cope with economic and social 
uncertainty;  subjective  well-being  is  a  psychological  resource  that  helps  people  to 
maintain a positive attitude, while participation in informal work indicates an ability to 
act regardless of labor market insecurity. Both subjective well-being and informal work 
are significantly related to wanting and having additional children. Although the factors 
are not directly related, they can be seen as indicators of the willingness to take on 
additional responsibilities, including childbearing and rearing. The study  shows that 
psychological factors are more important to the limitation of childbearing than purely 
economic factors, lending support to the anomie explanation of fertility decline. The 
evidence in the study applies to Russia, but similar influences most likely play a role in 
additional childbearing in Ukraine as well.   
 
 
5.3 Ideational change  
Fertility decline in Ukraine may also be due to changes in values and belief systems. 
With  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Ukraine  has  been  flooded  with  external 
influences that may be changing priorities, behaviors, and the way people think. Some 
demographers  argue  that  Ukraine  is  on  the  verge  of  the  Second  Demographic 
Transition,  purported  to  have  occurred  in  some  Western  European  countries  in  the 
1960s  and  1970s  (Van  de  Kaa  1987,  Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn  2002).  The  Second 
Demographic  Transition  theory  argues  that  changes  in  family  structures,  including 
declines in fertility, later ages at first marriage and birth, and increases in cohabitation 
and  non-marital  childbearing  occur  concomitantly  with  a  reorientation  towards 
autonomy, secularization, and self-interest (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). According to 
the  theory
2,  individuals,  and  in  particular  women,  re-prioritize  career  and  self-
actualization over family and childbearing. Some demographers argue that Russia is on 
the threshold of SDT, part of the evolutionary trend towards the ‘Western’ model of 
family formation, although with a unique Russian twist (Vishnevsky 1996, Gerber and 
Berman 2005, Zakharov 2006). They posit that the shift constitutes part of the natural 
                                                            
2 Some argue that the term ‘Second Demographic Transition’ (and indeed the ‘First Demographic Transition’) 
is not a theory, but rather a description of emerging trends, or at best, merely an explanation of these trends. I 
will refer to Lesthaeghe’s conceptualization of the term, which points to ideational change as a primary factor 
influencing the new trends in family behavior.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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process of modernization, a process that has always been met with some degree of 
resistance in Russia (Vishnevsky 1996).  
Proponents of the Second Demographic Transition point to the rapid change in 
demographic  trends  in  Russia  as  evidence  that  the  SDT  is  occurring.  For  example, 
Zakharov and Ivanova (1996) interpret trends such as the decrease in the number of 
abortions, the increase in non-marital childbearing, and the decline in the number of 
births in the 15-19 age group as signs that Russia is on the verge of the SDT. Gerber 
and Berman (2008) conclude that the rapid decline in marriage in post-Soviet Russia is 
due to normative change rather than economic conditions. Few studies, however, have 
been able to show that these trends are due to an actual shift in values. Using the World 
Values Surveys, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002) provide evidence that cohabitation and 
divorce in Eastern Europe are associated with more ‘non-conformist’ values, but they 
are not able to show the magnitude of this trend or its change over time. In fact, the new 
trends may be the result of economic or cultural factors that have little to do with a shift 
towards SDT. As mentioned above, non-marital childbearing in Ukraine is associated 
with  incomplete  high-school  education  rather  than  higher  education  (Perelli-Harris, 
forthcoming), possibly due to impoverished conditions rather than a Scandinavian-type 
shift towards cohabitation. Therefore, further research is needed to show how ideational 




5.4 Unequal gender relations  
The gender equity explanation argues that different levels of support for women have 
resulted in variation in fertility (Chesnais 1998; McDonald 2000). In very low fertility 
countries, such as Italy and Spain, women have made major gains in terms of equality 
in the educational system and the labor force, but have not achieved similar levels of 
equality within the home. Women are provided with little domestic childcare or state 
childrearing support and must decide whether to limit their childbearing or reduce their 
career aspirations. In Northern European countries, on the other hand, women receive 
more  assistance  from  their  partners  and  from  governmental  resources,  including 
subsidized childcare and maternity leave. As a result, these countries have maintained 
fertility levels closer to replacement (McDonald 2000).  
The gender equity situation in Ukraine is complex; for decades Ukrainian women 
have had almost the same educational outcomes and labor-force participation rates as 
men,  but  gender  roles  and  attitudes  have  remained  conservative.  During  the  Soviet 
period,  the  communist  party  pushed  for  gender  equality  in  order  to  expand  the 
workforce, and to some degree it worked: by 1987, Soviet women comprised 51% of Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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the labor force. Some fields, such as medicine and education, came to be dominated by 
women. Yet despite the constitutional proclamation that men and women are equal, 
genuine equality never materialized in the Soviet Union. State policies excluded women 
from night shifts and hazardous labor (Dudwick et al. 2002), and women primarily held 
jobs  in  the  semi-skilled  professional  sector  or  they  held  low-skilled  jobs  (Brainerd 
2000). The result was “not so much an equalization as a feminization of the lower levels 
of the vocational hierarchy: women occupied the worst-paid and least prestigious jobs 
and were poorly represented on the higher rungs of the vocational ladder.” (Kon 1995).  
Now, the situation of inequality is not helped by the unstable economy and high 
unemployment rates. According to the focus group respondents, the current economic 
conditions  have  provided  few  opportunities  for  career  development.  Female  focus 
group respondents spoke of discrimination in hiring, especially for women who may 
become pregnant or have young children. Either because they face discrimination or by 
personal choice, post-Soviet women still rarely participate in senior management or 
highly visible political positions (Sperling 2000). Official statistics reflect this disparity: 
female unemployment stands at 14%, compared to 10% for male unemployment, and 
the wage differential for men and women is 36% (UNDP 2002a). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that women express little interest in pursuing a long-term, self-actualizing 
career in such an environment, although as the economy improves, women may begin 
to re-orient themselves towards professional development.   
Within the domestic sphere, traditional gender roles have largely been maintained. 
Both male and female focus group respondents spoke of the husband’s responsibility to 
financially support his family, and the wife’s natural concern for child care, cooking 
and  cleaning,  and  other  household  duties  (Perelli-Harris  2005).  These  attitudes, 
however, rarely result in a breadwinner family model, especially in today’s uncertain 
labor market. Only in elite circles can families afford for the woman to stay at home 
permanently (Sperling 2000). Instead, women usually take on the ‘double burden’ of 
employment  outside  the  home  combined  with  domestic  responsibilities.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that women often work full-time and then continue to be busy around 
the house long into the evening, while husbands relax.  
In conclusion, the gender equity argument may have some relevance to Ukraine’s 
situation  of  lowest-low  fertility.  As  in  Southern  Europe,  Ukrainian  women  have 
experienced increased equality in the workforce; a large proportion of the Ukrainian 
female population has achieved higher education and participates in the labour force. 
As in Southern Europe, too, the gender distribution of domestic work in Ukraine is 
unequal, and up until recently there was little state support for families (see below). 
However,  this  difficulty  in  combining  work  and  domestic  responsibilities  is  not  a 
phenomenon new to Ukraine either; Soviet women also struggled under the ‘double 
burden’, but often chose to have more than one child. Therefore, other factors, such as Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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economic uncertainty, anomie, or changing values, must be exacerbating the situation, 
making the difficulty of combining work and childbearing more acute. 
 
 
6. Family policy  
Ironically, Ukraine has one of the most generous but least effective family policies in 
the world. Much of the generosity of the system arose during the socialist era, when the 
Soviet state proclaimed that women were equal to men and attempted to incorporate 
them into the labor force. As a result, state-sponsored maternity leave and childcare 
facilities allowed women to combine work and childbearing, leading to female labor-
force  participation  rates  that  were  nearly  the  same  as  those  for  men  (Gerber  and 
Mayorova 2006). The Soviet state was also concerned about the decline in fertility to 
replacement level, which became evident in the 1970s (Zakharov 2006). In an attempt 
to address this problem, the Soviet state enacted concrete measures in 1982 with the 
goal of raising fertility. Mothers in Ukraine who had worked more than a year or who 
had interrupted their work in order to study received partially paid leave, – 35 rubles per 
month at that time -- to look after a child through the first year These women also had 
the right to additional unpaid leave for an extra half a year without interruption of social 
security benefits. In 1990, pregnancy and birth leave at full pay was expanded to 70 
days before birth and 56 days after birth (special circumstances allowed for 70 days 
postpartum leave). The period of paid maternity leave at minimum wage was expanded 
to one and a half years, with a payment of 70 rubles.  
After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the Ukrainian government began to 
finance its own social protection programs and expanded the budget allocated to such 
programs; however, the amount dedicated to family programs was minimal (Chemerys 
et al. 2002). The period of partially paid maternity leave was expanded to two years, 
and unpaid leave was expanded to three years without interruption of social security 
benefits. In 1996, maternity leave benefits were expanded to three years, and women 
received a token amount that varied throughout the period. The amount of the benefits 
depended on whether a woman was insured through her workplace or whether she was 
engaged in formal employment. Due to budget constraints and mismanagement, the 
amount  legislated  for  childcare  benefits  often  differed  from  actual  payments.  For 
example, in 2001 women with social insurance were entitled by law to receive 74 UAH 
($14) per month, but on average, the actual payments received were a mere 22 UAH 
($4) per month. Women without insurance were entitled to receive 37 UAH, but in 
actuality received 7 UAH (Chemerys et al. 2002). Considering the inconvenience of 
collecting the materials and signatures needed for the application, some women did not 
bother collecting the small amount. Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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Nonetheless,  focus  group  discussions  conducted  in  2003  revealed  that  many 
Ukrainian  women  expect  the  government  to  provide  support  for  families  and 
childbearing  (Perelli-Harris  2003).  Most  respondents  believed  they  were  entitled  to 
three  years  of  maternity  leave  with  state  support.  Some  respondents  expressed  the 
opinion that the government was responsible for the low fertility rate, not only because 
of  economic  mismanagement,  but  also  because  of  a  lack  of  financial  support  for 
families with children. Some respondents complained that maternity leave benefits were 
barely enough to buy a packet of Pampers, much less provide them with the necessities 
for raising a child. These attitudes reveal an underlying expectation of state support, 
which is an attitude commonly held in socialist societies.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the condition of childcare facilities also 
deteriorated substantially. State-subsidized childcare facilities declined by a third after 
1990 (UNDP Ukraine 2003). While some of the facilities closed due to declining birth 
rates, many were affected by budget cuts and the transformation of the workplace from 
state-run  to  private.  For  example,  many  rural  daycare  centers  once  operated  by 
collective farms closed down due to restructuring and privatization (Nikolaenko 2006). 
Although some private daycare centers arose to take the place of public facilities, they 
were often expensive.  As a  result,  families now  have to decide  whether to provide 
childcare themselves or rely on relatives, often grandmothers.  
In  April  of  2005,  the  Ukrainian  government  increased  child  assistance 
dramatically. New mothers now receive a one-time payment of 3,384 hryvna ($677) 
following the birth of a child, and 5114 hryvnia ($1023) to be paid throughout the 
course of the next year. The total sum of 8500 hryvnia is a substantial amount in a 
country  where  the  average  monthly  wage  is  about  760  hryvnia  per  month  ($152) 
(Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 2005). In addition, for three years after the birth of a 
child, women receive maternity payments based on household income, but not less than 
90 hryvnia per month ($18). This amount changes at least once a year, depending on the 
state budget.  
Although 8500 hrynvia is a substantial sum, it is questionable how well the new 
system works. First, the payments are not spread uniformly throughout the country – 
women in major cities have much better access to benefits than their counterparts in 
outlying  regions  (Levchuk  2006).  Even  a  year  after  the  enactment  of  the  law  in 
question, some regions still experienced budget deficits that delayed actual payments. 
Second, women have to struggle against complicated bureaucratic procedures in order 
to receive payments. Women must provide documents at different locations throughout 
the city, queue up in long lines, and deal with bureaucratic inefficiencies – and all this 
with a young infant (Gurina 2005). Finally, there is a six month limit to completing the 
application process; this is barely enough time to collect all the documents, especially 
while recovering from the birth of the child.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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Although  the  latest  data  from  the  Ukrainian  statistical  bureau  already  shows  a 
slight increase in births compared to previous years, demographers in Ukraine question 
whether  the  assistance  will  actually  raise  fertility  in  the  long-run  (Steshenko  2005, 
Levchuk 2006). Because the payments are restricted to 12 months after childbirth, they 
provide little support for childcare before pre-school or raising the child afterwards. 
They  are  not  specifically  directed  towards  second  and  higher-order  births,  the 
elimination  of  which  is  primarily  responsible  for  the  sharp  decline  in  fertility.  The 
payments also do little to address larger socio-economic problems, such as low living 
standards, insufficient wages, or expensive housing. Steshenko (2005) speculates that 
encouraging the growth of small and medium-size businesses would be more effective 
in  increasing  fertility  than  paying  families  directly.  Levchuk  (2006)  suggests  that 
government-subsidized  housing  loans  would  do  more  to  encourage  larger  families. 
Some Ukrainians also worry that this assistance will only be used by people with lesser 
means, thus stimulating fertility only among the lesser educated population.  
In conclusion, Ukraine’s family policy now appears to be one of the most generous 
in the world, entailing a one-time payment of $1700 plus three years of paid maternity 
leave. However, in reality, the irregularities of payment, the low level of parental leave 
benefits,  insufficient  support  throughout  the  period  of  childrearing,  and  neglect  of 
childcare  facilities  all  dilute  the  policy’s  effectiveness.  And,  considering  that  living 
conditions generally are poor and that government action is ineffective in other spheres 
of  life,  it  is  questionable  whether  these  policies  will  have  much  of  an  impact  on 
reproductive  decision-making. This  amount  will  be  enough  to  stimulate  fertility  for 
some couples – especially given the expectation of state support in terms of childrearing 
– but it is unlikely that the  new policies by themselves  will be able to reverse the 
population decline.  
 
 
7. Other influential factors  
The  explanations  discussed  above,  including  the  influence  of  family  policy,  can  be 
considered overarching reasons behind fertility decline in Ukraine. However, specific 
factors  that  have  rarely  been  discussed  or  explored  possibly  also  lead  to  fertility 
limitation. In this section, I will outline other factors that may be of importance to 
reproductive decision-making.  
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7.1 The changing relationship between parental leave and second births  
An analysis of the ULMS indicates that the relationship between parental leave and 
fertility changed after Ukraine gained independence (Perelli-Harris, 2006b). Compared 
to Soviet women, post-Soviet women on parental leave had second children at higher 
rates than women not on parental leave. This change in relationship indicates that the 
childbearing behavior of working and non-working women diverged. The divergence 
may be due to a number of factors. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union weakened 
work requirements; women who wanted to stay at home to raise children were now able 
to  do  so.  Second,  rapid  social  change  led  to  an  increase  in  the  diversity  of  norms 
regarding  work  and  childbearing,  allowing  underlying  beliefs  about  gender  roles  to 
become expressed in more conservative behavior, such as remaining on parental leave 
and having a second child. Third, the deterioration of economic conditions changed the 
opportunity costs of childbearing. After Ukraine gained independence, working women 
became  less  likely  to  disrupt  employment  with  pregnancy  and  childrearing  as  they 
feared  dismissal  from  their  job;  inadequate  anti-discrimination  legislation  and  weak 
enforcement of women’s rights did little to protect them from layoffs (Dudwick et al. 
2002). Job uncertainty of the husband led working women to avoid job disruption in 
order to ensure household income stability. The decline in childcare facilities made it 
even more difficult to combine the roles of worker and mother. Then again, women 
who desired to have more children may have found the opportunity costs of returning to 
work too high. If available jobs were incompatible with childrearing, e.g., in that they 
did not offer part-time work or flexible working hours, family-oriented women may 
have decided to stay on maternity leave. These women may have compressed their birth 
interval  to  fulfill  their  fertility  intentions.  In  conclusion,  the  changing  relationship 
between parental leave and fertility reveals an emerging behavioral trend that requires a 
new way of theorizing about the decline to very low fertility.  
 
 
7.2 Lack of housing  
Limited affordable housing and insufficient space is possibly one of the main factors 
discouraging childbearing in Ukraine. Difficult access to home-ownership is a proposed 
factor  leading  to  the  postponement  of  childbearing  in  other  lowest-low  fertility 
countries,  such  as  Italy  and  Spain  (Palomba  2001;  Mulder  and  Billari  2006).  In 
Ukraine, insufficient or unaffordable housing is not  necessarily resulting in delayed 
entry into parenthood, but it may be restricting family size. Many young couples with 
one child can cope with small living quarters by sharing resources with their parents; 
intergenerational households are a common solution to housing shortages. But couples Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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may  feel  that  sharing  a  one  or  two-bedroom  apartment  with  their  parents  and  two 
children is unfeasible.  
During the Soviet era, families also had to cope with limited housing space. Urban 
apartments  were  often  very  small  and  it  was  not  uncommon  for  families  to  share 
communal space or live in dormitories. Now, many of these housing conditions have 
improved; e.g., communal living is rare. However, changing attitudes and expectations 
lead  couples  to  place  a  greater  emphasis  on  housing  when  making  childbearing 
decisions. The same ideational change that is shifting priorities towards individualism, 
the career, or material goods may also influence space requirements. In addition, access 
to home-ownership has become more difficult. Before the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, couples applied for housing and received an apartment within a few years. In the 
late 1980s, the birth of a child qualified families for larger apartments. After Ukraine 
gained independence, however, the housing market was privatized and moving into a 
new residence required a significant outlay of cash or an inheritance. Loans continue to 
have exorbitantly high interest rates and require large down-payments. Thus, upward 
mobility in the housing market is limited and many young couples doubt that they will 




7.3 Intergenerational support  
Given  the  historical  interdependence  and  co-residence  of  multiple  generations  in 
Ukraine (Coale 1992), it is important to study the role of grandparents in fertility timing 
and  decline.  Russia  and  Ukraine  have  a  long-standing  practice  of  intergenerational 
wealth  flows  from  older  to  younger  generations  (Buckley  2001).  Parents  and 
grandparents often help young couples when they have financial problems, for example, 
by providing housing or supplying produce from the village. Grandmothers frequently 
provide childcare assistance, sometimes on a regular basis, thus allowing mothers to 
return to work. The parental resources help to maintain an early age of childbearing – 
young couples can negotiate economic constraints with the support of older generations 
(Perelli-Harris 2005). However, because this support usually takes the form of housing, 
childcare services, or goods, parents may still face cash shortfalls for expenses and 
decide to limit additional childbearing.  
Owing to a decrease or delay in pensions due to state budget restrictions, older 
generations have fewer resources at their disposal to help their children. In many cases, 
the middle-aged generation has to support not only its children but also its parents or 
other relatives (Steshenko 2000). These changes in intergenerational wealth flows may 
be contributing to fertility limitation. In addition, given the reliance on grandmothers Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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for  childcare  assistance,  the  deteriorating  health  of  the  elderly  population  may  be 
influencing childbearing decision-making. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
mortality and  morbidity  has  been increasing, resulting in lower life expectancy and 
increased  disabilities  among  the  retired  population  (Steshenko  2000). The  uncertain 
health of the older generations puts pressure on women of childbearing age to have 
children  earlier,  i.e.  at  a  time  when  parents  can  still  provide  financial  support  and 
childcare  assistance  (Gabriel  2005).  Such  pressures  may  also  contribute  to  fertility 
limitation, since couples now have fewer resources to assist with childrearing.  
 
 
7.4 Stress, poor health lifestyles, and marital quality  
Although social anomie is one of the leading explanations of fertility decline in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, few studies have investigated the relationship between 
fertility and a broad array of indicators of anomie, such as stress, risky behaviors, poor 
health, alcoholism, and poor marital quality. As discussed above, Perelli-Harris (2006a) 
found an association between fertility and subjective well-being in Russia; Philipov, 
Speder, and Billari (2005) investigated the relationship between psychological  well-
being,  disorientation,  and  birth  intentions  in  Bulgaria  and  Hungary.  These  studies, 
however, focus on relatively simple psychological indicators, as opposed to the specific 
mechanisms  that  may  be  causing  the  low  levels  of  well-being.  More  sophisticated 
measures of stress are needed to help locate the source of the psychological discontent 
and disentangle the relative influence of stressful life events versus personality type.  
Poor health lifestyles, which have been one of the leading causes of mortality in 
the former Soviet Union (Cockerham 2002), may be discouraging mothers from having 
additional children. After Ukraine gained independence, male mortality from accidents, 
poisonings, and trauma increased drastically (Steshenko 2000). The increase in risky 
behavior  not  only  resulted  in  an  increase  in  deaths,  it  also  affected  home  life  and 
household stability. Alcoholism in particular took a toll on the family (Gabriel 2005). 
Alcoholism  in  Ukraine  has  been  incredibly  high;  according  to  the  2002  Ukrainian 
World Mental Health survey, the rate of alcoholism in Ukraine was higher than in any 
other European country with a comparable survey (Bromet et al. 2005). Alcoholism has 
been particularly prevalent among men of working age, when men are expected to be 
engaged  in  childrearing  (Bromet  et  al.  2005).  Alcoholism  often  results  in  negative 
behaviors that threaten the family, such as despondency, violent outbreaks, or abuse. 
Such behaviors may be negatively impacting the decision to have more children.  
Stress  and  negative  health  behaviors  often  lead  to  poor  marital  relations  and 
divorce, which in turn depresses fertility. Ukraine has one of the highest divorce rates in 
the world – in 2000 there were 4.0 divorces per 1000 people (Derzhkomstat 2001). The Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 29 
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high level of marital dissolution most likely limits additional childbearing, especially if 
the dissolution occured early in marriage (although completed fertility occurring before 
divorce  may  have  no  effect  on  total  fertility,  and  remarriages  may  actually  lead  to 
additional childbearing). Regardless of actual marital dissolution, however, poor marital 
quality and marital uncertainty may be discouraging women from having additional 
children.  Research  conducted  in  the  United  States  shows  that  couples  in  unstable 
marriages have fewer children than couples in stable marriages (Myers 1997). People 
may think having children saves marriages, but it rarely does so. Thus, the deterioration 
of spousal relations is a major factor behind fertility decline in Ukraine. 
 
 
8. Conclusion  
The decline to very low fertility in Ukraine has been a complex process with no single 
explanation. Macro-level social and economic change has clearly led to a new form of 
childbearing  decision-making,  but  the  specific  causes  of  the  new  practices  are  still 
unknown. The two primary explanations for fertility decline in Ukraine – economic 
uncertainty and the Second Demographic Transition – lack the support of micro-level 
evidence.  No  study  has  found  a  direct  relationship  between  fertility  and  economic 
indicators  such  as  unemployment  or  income.  Likewise,  little  research  has  been 
conducted  showing  an  association  between  shifting  values  and  fertility  decline. 
Nonetheless,  economic  uncertainty  may  be  operating  through  other  unmeasured 
mechanisms, such as inadequate housing or pressure to support elderly parents, and 
some strata of the population may be experiencing the SDT. For example, more highly 
educated  women have experienced a reversal in childbearing behavior and are now 
leading the postponement of childbearing within marriage. This most likely indicates 
that  these  women  are  undergoing  substantial  ideational  change  (Perelli-Harris, 
forthcoming).  Thus,  economic  uncertainty  and  ideational  change  are  probable 
explanations, but require further research.  
In  any  case,  more  nuanced  approaches  are  necessary  to  better  understand  the 
situation. In particular, the concept of economic  uncertainty should be expanded to 
encompass a broader sense of psychological distress and anomie. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, individuals felt a loss of control over their lives, resulting in anxiety, 
stress, and a sense of hopelessness. As Perelli-Harris (2006a) shows, subjective well-
being and participation in informal work are two ways in which anomic conditions are 
buffered,  leading  to  additional  childbearing.  Other  symptoms  of  anomie,  such  as 
alcoholism,  stress,  risky  behaviors,  and  poor  marital  quality  may  be  negatively 
impacting the decision to have a child. The link between increases in mortality and Perelli-Harris: Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times  
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morbidity  and  decreases  in  fertility  calls  for  further  investigation;  both  may  be 
stemming from the same destructive behaviors, and ultimately social anomie. 
It is important to bear in mind that multiple trends in behavior have been emerging 
simultaneously, but not necessarily due to the same social forces. While some strata of 
the population  may be postponing or eliminating  higher  parity births as a result of 
changing  values  and  belief  structures,  others  may  be  adopting  more  conservative 
behaviors that accord with their concept of distinct gender roles (Perelli-Harris 2006b). 
The rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing may be the result of increased 
gender  equality  and  of  the  rejection  of  official  institutions  (as  in  the  Scandinavian 
countries)  or  it  may  be  due  to  impoverished  conditions  and  the  inability  to  afford 
marriage. Thus, rather than assuming that all individuals are on the way to becoming 
more autonomous, self-interested, and career-oriented, it is prudent to recognize the 
heterogeneity in the population. 
Finally, family policies may have a substantial impact on childbearing decision-
making, especially now that child allowance has been raised to 8500 hryvnia. It will be 
interesting  to  observe  whether  this  amount  actually  stimulates  childbearing  and  to 
which segments of the population this applies. The extent of the policies’ effect in the 
long run, however, is questionable, since they do not address other pressing needs of the 
population.  Affordable  housing,  decent  wages,  a  functional  government,  a  belief  in 
progress,  and  hope  for  the  future  are  all  necessary  to  change  attitudes  towards 
childbearing and halt the drastic decline of Ukraine’s population.   
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